Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Developing organizational and institutional fit in MNE subsidiary political strategy in contexts of institutional upheaval by Sallai, Dorottya & Schnyder, Gerhard
1 
 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Developing organizational and institutional fit in MNE 
subsidiary political strategy in contexts of institutional upheaval 
 
 
Dorottya Sallai, University of Greenwich, D.Sallai@greenwich.ac.uk  
 
Gerhard Schnyder, Loughborough University London, G.Schnyder@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
Recent corporate political activities (CPA) studies applying the “fit paradigm” found 
that foreign subsidiaries’ political capabilities in emerging markets are shaped not just by host 
country- but also by home country institutions: Subsidiaries of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) need to develop CPA that “fit” parent political capabilities. Yet, this literature 
neglects that this “organizational fit” requirement goes together with an “institutional fit” 
requirement between subsidiary CPA and the host institutional environment. Achieving this 
dual fit is particularly difficult in very volatile institutional host environments where the value 
of political capabilities changes rapidly. In such environments subsidiaries face a dilemma 
between the decreasing “institutional fit” of easily transferable capabilities and the lack of 
“organizational fit” of necessary “sticky,” local ones. To understand how firms deal with this 
dilemma, we develop a typology of political capabilities that takes into account their varying 
transferability/stickiness and their dynamic institutional contingency in the host country. Our 
empirical study of Hungary shows that MNEs even from institutionally very different 
economies can successfully transfer political capabilities to develop effective CPA in a 
radically volatile political environment. Yet, as political risk becomes discontinuous, this 
strategy may reach its limits. [190 words] 
Keywords: nonmarket, strategies, MNE subsidiaries, capabilities, corporate political activities 
(CPA), transferability  
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1. Introduction 
The corporate political activities (CPA) literature emerged in the context of developed 
countries (Hillman et al., 2004; Hillman and Hitt, 1999) and has little to say about how the 
institutional context of emerging economies affects CPA (Deng and Kennedy, 2010; 
Mondejar and Zhao, 2013; White et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2016). Yet, CPA is particularly 
important in emerging market economies where the boundaries between the economic and the 
political domain are blurry (Carney et al., 2016; Luo, 2007; Nell et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 
2016) and institutional change is frequent and often radical (Oh and Oetzel, 2017; Young et 
al., 2008). Companies may have to develop political ‘coping’ strategies to deal with such 
institutionally volatility political environments (Danisz et al., 2010; Darendeli and Hill, 2016; 
Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Dieleman and Sachs, 2008; Iankova and Katz, 2003). Little 
is known about how foreign subsidiaries develop such local nonmarket strategies (Carney et 
al., 2016; White et al., 2018). 
Recent studies have shown that foreign subsidiaries’ host country political strategies 
are to an important extent determined by their home country institutional environment (White 
et al., 2018). Applying the “fit paradigm” (Brouthers et al., 2000; Luo & Park, 2001; Zajac et 
al., 2000) they suggest that “subsidiary performance outcomes may be affected by fit between 
an MNE parent's capabilities, developed as a means to successfully deal with home country 
institutions, and foreign subsidiary strategic practices abroad” (White et al., 2018: 2).  
Yet, while acknowledging the need for internal “fit” between parent and subsidiary 
capabilities and strategies, in terms of institutional pressures they either focus on home 
country institutions (White et al. 2018) or host country ones (Hillman & Wan, 2005), but do 
not acknowledge the simultaneous influence of both. Yet, MNEs are embedded in multiple 
institutional contexts and their political strategies are therefore simultaneously influenced by 
home- and host country contexts (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Zajac 
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et al. (2001) have previously argued that strategic fit needs to be conceptualized as a multi-
dimensional concept encompassing organizational strategy, organizational capabilities, and 
the organization’s environment. This creates “a potential tension in a firm’s seeking a fit 
between its strategy and its environmental situation vs. a fit between its strategy and its 
unique competencies.” (Zajac et al., 2001: 430). Applied to the MNE and acknowledging that 
political capabilities are partly shaped by the institutional environment (Whitley, 2007), this 
implies that effective CPA requires the subsidiary to simultaneously strive for “strategic fit” 
with institutionally-structured parent capabilities and “fit” with the host country environment. 
We call the former “organizational fit” and the latter “institutional fit.” Adding these two 
dimensions allows us to further develop the “fit paradigm” as applied to CPA. Indeed, this 
conceptualization raises two further issues that the extant literature does not explicitly 
address: firstly, the “fit paradigm” is based on the explicit assumption that political 
capabilities are transferable across borders (Carney et al., 2016; Holbourn & Zelner, 2010). 
Yet, this may not be the case of all political capabilities (cf. Hill & Wan, 2005). Indeed, it has 
been argued that some political capabilities are “developed based on the firm’s experience in 
a specific country and so may not be portable across geographies” (Doh et al., 2012: 31; also 
Bonardi et al., 2006). From the latter perspective, transfer of institutionally-structured 
political capabilities can be expected to be difficult. 
Secondly, existing studies on political capability transfer and fit - while 
acknowledging the temporal nature of capability development in the home context (Carney et 
al., 2016; White et al., 2018) - do not sufficiently acknowledge the implications of the 
instable institutional environment in the host context. Indeed, the very nature of “unstable” or 
“weak” environments implies that institutional pressures are in constant flux (Young et al., 
2008). The literature has shown that in volatile environments political capabilities may 
change in value dramatically when the institutional environment changes (Darendeli & Hill, 
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2016; Henisz and Delios, 2004; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Oetzel and Oh, 2014; 
Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2010). Therefore, it is crucial to pay more attention to the dynamic 
nature of fit between capabilities, strategies, and institutions (cf. Zajac et al., 2001). 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the “fit paradigm” by proposing an enhanced 
typology of political capabilities that connects the question of the “institutional structuring” 
(Whitley, 2007) of political capabilities to their transference across borders and their value to 
the subsidiary in terms of their fit with the host environment. We seek to answer two research 
questions: (1) How does the effectiveness and hence value of different types of foreign 
subsidiary political capabilities change during radical institutional change? (2) How do 
foreign subsidiaries manage to leverage different types of political capabilities through 
transfer or local development to adapt their CPA to the radically changing host environment? 
We argue that different institutional environments require and therefore lead firms to 
develop different types of capabilities, whose inherent characteristics also determine the 
degree to which they are transferable from parent to subsidiaries. Rather than assuming that 
all political capabilities are equally transferable, we draw on the “practice transfer” literature 
(Edwards et al., 2015; Gamble, 2010; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004; Kostova, 1999) and 
provide an explicit theorization of the determinants and degree of the transferability of 
political capabilities. 
Our empirical context is Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s governments since 2010. 
During this period, firms operating in Hungary have experienced a phase of radical 
institutional change that is often referred to as “institutional backsliding.” Institutional 
backsliding is characterized by a “reversal” of the transition process from a socialist economy 
to a Western-style market economy and is characterized by an increasing concentration of 
state power, the personalization of economic and political exchanges, and the undermining of 
rules-based forms of economic transactions (Sallai & Schnyder, 2015). As such, Hungary 
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constitutes a politically instable environment where the rules of the game are deliberately kept 
in constant flux. 
We compare the political strategies of MNE subsidiaries from developed countries 
(DMNEs) with domestic Hungarian firms (DFs). While MNE subsidiaries draw on a wide 
range of transferred and locally-developed capabilities, DFs can only draw on locally-
developed ones. As such, they constitute a “control group” in our natural experiment research 
design. While the Western home countries of MNE subsidiaries vary in institutional 
characteristics too, they share the basic feature of a home institutional environment that – 
contrary to the Hungarian host environment – provides a certain level of “generalized trust,” 
which is crucial to make rule-based, arm’s-length transactions outside of one’s personal 
network possible (Chen & Deakin, 2015; Peng, 2003; Whitley, 2007). 
Based on our empirical case, we develop propositions regarding the effectiveness of 
transferred political capabilities and their impact on MNE subsidiary competitive advantage 
in a changing environment. We answer recent calls for longitudinal qualitative studies on 
political capabilities that allow us to trace the development of political capabilities and their 
co-evolution with their environment (Sun et al., 2015: 1059).  
We contribute to the resource-based view approach to CPA (Frynas et al., 2006; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Lawton et al., 2013a; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), by enhancing 
existing typologies that do not take into account the question of the transferability – or its 
opposite “stickiness,” defined as the difficulty with which organizational practices or routines 
can be transferred across borders (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004; Szulanski, 1996) – and the 
related question of the contingent value of political capabilities in fast-changing institutional 
environments. We also contribute to the recent literature on transfer of political capabilities 
that considers the “strategic fit” between subsidiary nonmarket strategy with parent company 
capabilities and home country institutions key to the success of nonmarket strategies (White 
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et al., 2018). Our study suggests that a second type of fit is equally important, namely 
“institutional fit” between subsidiary CPA and host country institutional environment. Figure 
1 summarizes our model (see Appendix 1). As such, our study makes an important 
contribution to the understudied question of how institutional differences across countries 
shape MNE political activities (Doh et al., 2012: 27; Liedong et al., 2015; White et al., 2018). 
We also make an important empirical contribution by gathering unique primary data about 
CPA through semi-structured interviews with top level managers in an emerging market 
economy with a very volatile political environment. Such studies remain scarce, which has 
hampered theorization (Lux et al., 2011; White et al., 2018). 
2. Literature and Theory 
Like organizational practices and structures in general, CPA tends to co-evolve with its 
institutional environment (Doh et al., 2012; Feinberg et al., 2015; Hillman and Wan, 2005; 
Lux et al., 2011), as institutions play an important role in structuring the type of political 
capabilities a firm develops (Bonardi et al, 2006; Holbourn and Zelner, 2010; White et al., 
2018; generally Whitley, 2007). In the case of MNEs and their subsidiaries, this implies that 
each subsidiary is exposed to two institutional environments – the home and the host country 
ones (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Existing CPA studies have either focused on how this 
“institutional duality” forces companies to achieve internal legitimacy – i.e. strategic fit 
between host and parent political strategy – at the same time as external legitimacy in the host 
environment (Hillman & Wan, 2005), or how home country institutions shape parent 
capabilities with which subsidiary political strategies need to strategically fit (White et al., 
2018). Curiously, the existing literature has not considered the specific challenge that the dual 
constraint from host and home institutions posits in terms of legitimacy and fit. Indeed, the 
institutional structuring of capabilities by the home and the host environment imply that the 
subsidiary’s capabilities will be a mixture of transferred capabilities shaped by the home 
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context and locally-developed ones shaped by the host context (cf. Gamble, 2010). What this 
literature overlooks, however, is that the transference of home country political capabilities to 
a host setting meets a dual challenge; namely to achieve simultaneously “organizational fit” 
with parent political capabilities and “institutional fit” with the host country institutional 
environment. The challenge to achieve “institutional fit” is enhanced in volatile host 
environments such as developing countries (Carney et al., 2016; White et al., 2018). 
An effective political strategy therefore will need to combine transferred and locally-
developed capabilities in a way that both satisfies “organizational fit” with the parent 
company and “institutional fit” with the host environment. Our framework is based on the 
assumption that a theory of political capabilities therefore needs to include more 
systematically the determinants of transferability of political capabilities across borders and 
the changing “value” – in terms of institutional fit – of political capabilities in the changing 
host setting. 
2.1. The fit paradigm: Organizational- and institutional fit of political capabilities 
The “fit paradigm” (Brouthers et al., 2000; White et al., 2018) – often implicitly – 
comprises two analytically distinct claims: firstly, that companies need to seek a fit between 
their strategies and the companies’ distinctive capabilities; secondly, that the strategy and the 
capabilities it is based on also need to match the companies’ external environment. This 
constitutes what Zajac et al. (2001) call the multi-dimensional nature of the concept of 
“strategic fit.” We call the former phenomenon “organizational fit” and the latter 
“institutional fit.” White et al.’s (2018) useful attempt to apply the “fit paradigm” to political 
strategies, while explicitly acknowledging the institutional structuring of capabilities, focuses 
on the “organizational fit” of subsidiary strategies with parent company capabilities, but 
neglects the “institutional fit” between subsidiary political strategy and host institutional 
environment. Hillman and Wan (2005), on the other hand, do touch upon the “institutional 
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fit” between host country context and subsidiary political strategy, but the question of which 
strategies rely on easily transferable capabilities and which ones on “sticky” ones is not 
systematically theorized. To fill this gap in the literature, two questions need to be answered: 
What types of political capabilities do different institutional contexts require? What 
determines their transferability across national boundaries? We tackle them in turn. 
2.2 Institutional contexts and fitting capabilities 
Most of the extant CPA literature focuses on developed economies (Bonardi, 2011; 
Hillman et al., 2004; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008) and assumes a fundamentally stable 
political environment. Yet, the notion that political capabilities and strategies differ across 
institutional settings is well-established. The most basic distinction here is between 
institutional environments that support generalized arm’s-length exchange via markets based 
on a strong legal system of public ordering, which we call rule-governed contexts (cf. Chen & 
Deakin, 2015; Whitley, 2007; Peng, 2003), and systems where economic exchange is mainly 
based on private ordering through relationships as personal mechanisms to generate trust (e.g. 
Carney et al., 2016; Peng 2003). To be sure, there is a great variety of national institutional 
systems within each one of these categories (Witt et al., 2017; Fainshmidt et al., 2017). Yet, 
the distinction between rule-governed and relationship-based systems captures a 
fundamentally different way of transacting, that has crucial implications for the question of 
(political) capabilities (Whitely, 2007). 
Relationship-based systems often exist in more volatile and uncertain environments 
than rule-based ones (Peng, 2003; Young et al., 2008). Yet, we can further distinguish such 
volatile and uncertain political environments where risks are continuous – e.g. corruption 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) – and hence relatively predictable for firms, from environments 
where political risk become “discontinuous” and hence unpredictable, e.g. revolutions and 
military coups (Oetzel and Oh, 2014). Extremely volatile political environments, where state 
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intervention becomes completely arbitrary, come close to what is described as “discontinuous 
risk.” 
These different institutional contexts – rule-governed stable, relationship-based 
predictable, relationship-based volatile – favor different types of CPA. In rule-governed 
systems, where transactional market exchanges are the norm, CPA is “largely about legal, 
firm-level engagement with institutionalized political actors and structures” (Lawton et al., 
2013 a: 87). CPA is a professionalized, issue-driven activity, that follows fairly transparent 
and clear “rules of the game” (Griffin and Dunn, 2004; McGrath, 2005; Van Schendelen, 
2012; Thomson and John, 2007; Beyers et al., 2008) and which is mostly viewed as an 
“essential, legitimate and distinguishable activity, which supplements business activity” 
(Hadjikhani and Ghauri, 2006: 391). Lobbying is managed within formal institutions - based 
on arm’s length transactions - and the organizational capabilities of lobbying firms or interest 
groups (i.e. public affairs know-how). 
The formalized, or “structured” CPA that prevails in rule-governed systems does not 
exist in relationship-based systems (Lawton et al., 2013a: 92). Here, the public affairs culture 
is missing (Harsányi and Schmidt, 2012) and CPA remains a taboo (Sallai, 2013). Instead, 
CPA is mainly limited to informal personal contacts between politicians, public officials, and 
managers. Informal network- and relationship-based types of CPA matter in developed 
countries too (King and Pearce 2010; McDonnell and Werner 2016); but they tend to be less 
important, more transparent, and less particularistic than in developing ones (Peng 2003; Sun 
et al., 2015). 
As such, the institutional context may make certain CPA types ineffective. Indeed, the 
political capabilities that Western researchers consider associated with political strategies – 
such as “the introduction of incentive systems that accelerate the speed and quality with 
which public policy demands are implemented” (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008: 508), may be 
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utterly inadequate to deal with volatile relationship-based environments (Darendeli and Hill, 
2016; Oh and Oetzel, 2017). In particular, radically changing political environments – e.g. 
due to wars and rebellions – dramatically change the effectiveness of certain political 
resources and require specific political strategies based on locally-developed political 
capabilities for firms to survive (Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Getz and Oetzel, 2009; Oetzel and 
Oh, 2014; Oh and Oetzel, 2017). In such situations, even political ties may be unreliable 
political resources and more sophisticated, locally-adapted CPA may be required (Darendeli 
and Hill, 2016; White et al., 2018). 
Conversely, relationship-based strategies and the related resources and capabilities, 
may lose their legitimacy, effectiveness, and hence value when the institutional environment 
moves from a relationship-based towards a rule-based or arm’s length system (Sun et al., 
2010). Certain types of CPA may simply not be considered legitimate in certain environments 
and may hence be counterproductive (Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Sallai, 2013). This goes 
beyond the question of whether the company engaging in CPA is perceived as an outsider and 
hence considered illegitimate (Hillman & Wan, 2005), but concerns the very nature of the 
capabilities themselves that firms – outsider or not – mobilize. 
From the “fit perspective,” this hints at a tension facing subsidiaries of Western MNEs 
active in environments characterized by volatility and in particular “institutional backsliding”: 
while they need to strive for “organizational fit” of their political strategies with their home 
country institutionally-shaped capabilities, the latter may become increasingly ineffective in 
dealing with a host country institutional environment that moves away from formal 
institutions and becomes less predictable. Conversely, those that are most effective at 
achieving “institutional fit” in the host context, are the least suitable to achieve 
“organizational fit,” e.g. because particularistic personal political capabilities are less 
legitimate in the home environment. Moreover, the capabilities needed to deal with the 
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volatile environment may not be readily available to subsidiaries, as they are strongly locally-
embedded and may take a long time for firms to develop (Carney et al., 2016; Darendeli and 
Hill, 2016), while the capability to quickly mobilize political resources constitutes a crucial 
dynamic capability for firms to cope with volatile environments (Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008). We call this the “transferability-value dilemma” – whereby the most readily available 
capabilities through transfer are the least valuable in the volatile context, while the most 
valuable ones are both more difficult for subsidiaries to acquire and reduce “organizational 
fit.” In the next section, we argue that the resolution to will depend on the transferability of 
different types of political capabilities. 
2.3 The transferability of political capabilities 
The “fit paradigm” as applied to the CPA literature is implicitly based on a strong assumption 
regarding the transfer of capabilities and practices from headquarters to subsidiaries. Indeed, 
“organizational fit” essentially implies that subsidiaries develop strategies that use the same 
capabilities as the parent company, which in turn necessitates transference. 
The MNE’s ability to leverage intangible knowledge resources and reconfigure assets 
across national borders constitutes possibly its most important dynamic capability (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2010; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). This also applies to CPA: MNEs can transfer 
political capabilities developed in the home country (Carney et al., 2016; Holbourn and 
Zelner, 2010) or in other host countries (Delios and Henisz, 2003) to a new host environment. 
Carney et al. (2016) show that certain capabilities to deal with authoritarian governments can 
be transferred across similar institutional environments. Similarly, White et al.’s (2018: 13) 
implicitly consider intra-MNE transference of non-market practices through “people, 
processes, resources” to be straightforward. 
Transference of political capabilities may reduce the time an organization needs to 
adapt to a new political environment, because transfer of existing capabilities can be expected 
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to be quicker than locally developing new ones and may hence constitute a key capacity to 
develop effective political strategies in volatile environments (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  
Yet, the literature on transfer of practices (Edwards et al., 1999; Edwards et al., 2015; 
Ferner et al., 2012; Gamble, 2010; Kostova, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008) and in particular on 
the “stickiness” of practices and capabilities (Szulanski, 1996; Jensen & Szulanski, 2004) has 
shown that leveraging capabilities across borders is far from a straightforward process. Not 
all political capabilities may be transferable across borders (Bonardi et al., 2006; Doh et al., 
2012; Oh and Oetzel, 2017). Yet, the determinants of transferability of political capabilities 
have not systematically been studied. Here we draw on the practice transfer literature to cover 
this gap. 
The transfer literature considers that a key factor affecting political capabilities’ 
transferability or “stickiness” is the ability to codify the underlying knowledge. Thus, 
Dunning and Lundan (2010: 1227) consider that “transfer requires that specific practices can 
be isolated and articulated into routines that can become ‘best practices’.” If a capability is 
codifiable, “knowledge-based conduits” of transfer, such as specialist information systems, 
can be put in place to facilitate transfer within the MNE (Edwards et al., 2015).  
Yet, by far not all political capabilities are codifiable. Indeed, many of them are 
related to informal practices that are based on very personal and tacit knowledge. Thus, in 
general, Hillman and Wan (2005: 328) argue that the financial incentive political strategy can 
be more easily transferred across borders than the information- and constituency-building 
strategies, because the former are based on tangible assets (such as money) while the latter 
rely on relational “political skills.” Oh and Oetzel (2017) find that the capability acquired by 
an MNE subsidiary to manage violent conflict may be too country-specific to be valuable in 
another host country (Oh and Oetzel, 2017). They argue that discontinuous risks, i.e. “those 
that are episodic and difficult to anticipate” (Oh and Oetzel, 2017: 727) may require more in-
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depth, context-specific knowledge, which can be expected to make them less valuable in 
other contexts (also Oh and Oetzel, 2011; Perkins, 2014). Conversely, “continuous risks” – 
e.g. corruption and policy uncertainty – may be less country-specific and capabilities 
developed to deal with such risks in one country can be expected to be valuable to deal with 
similar risks in other countries (Oh and Oetzel, 2017: 727, Perkins, 2014). 
Capabilities that cannot easily be codified, may still be transferable to some extent, 
notably through “people-based conduits” for transfer of tacit knowledge, e.g. expats (Edwards 
et al., 2015). Yet, here the specificity of political capabilities is important: while production 
or sales related capabilities (Luo & Park, 2001), as well as capabilities related to internal 
functions such as HRM (Edwards et al., 2015) may involve employees at different levels, the 
nature of political strategies is such that they often concern the higher-echelons of the 
corporate hierarchy. This limits their transferability through people-based conduits, as the 
pool of holders of the required tacit knowledge is narrower in this area. 
We now turn to revisiting existing typologies of political capabilities to enhance them 
with the dimensions of stickiness/transferability. 
2.4 Typologies of political capabilities – old and new 
Different typologies of political strategies exist, which assume different types of 
resources and capabilities underlying each strategy. Hillman and Hitt (1999: 825) distinguish 
information-, financial incentive-, and constituency-building- strategies. The informational 
strategy is associated with formal lobbying or commissioning and delivering technical reports 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999: Table 1). The financial incentive strategy is associated with 
contributions to politicians and parties, while the constituency building strategy relies on 
grassroot mobilization of employees, suppliers, or customers.  
Oliver and Holzinger’s (2008) suggest another typology based on the distinction 
between a “compliance approach” and an “influence approach” to CPA. The former focuses 
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on a firm’s internal capabilities and aims at adapting the organisation to its political 
environment by reacting to regulatory changes (the reactive strategy) or anticipating such 
changes (the anticipatory strategy). The influence approach, on the other hand, uses a firms’ 
external capabilities and aims at shaping the institutional environment by trying to protect the 
status quo from unwanted political change (the defensive strategy), or by actively promoting 
institutional change that benefits the firm (the pro-active strategy) (Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008: 507). Internal capabilities include organizational routines that insure compliance with 
laws and allow firms to anticipate policy change with a view to gain a first mover advantage 
by complying early (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008: 509). External capabilities include the 
deployment of social capital stemming from ties with policy-makers and lobbying to prevent 
changes that would undermine the company’s competitive advantage (Oliver and Hozlinger, 
2008: 510). 
These two classical typologies of political capabilities have two important 
shortcomings when applied to MNE CPA in emerging markets. Namely, they neglect the 
institutional structuring and fit of political capabilities (Whitley, 2007) and their 
transferability across borders (Carney et al., 2016).  
Regarding institutional structuring, Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) suggest that the three 
strategies and related capabilities can be deployed across a variety of contexts. Indeed, which 
strategy to choose is mainly a firm-level decision, while institutional factors are only a 
secondary determinant. The only institutional determinant in their framework is the degree of 
pluralism/corporatism that prevails in a country: In corporatist countries firms are more likely 
to choose a relational approach to CPA; attempting to establish relationships with policy 
makers to influence the political environment pro-actively and on an ongoing basis, often 
using collective action by business associations rather than individual action. In pluralist 
countries, a transactional CPA approach where firms deal with political and legislative issues 
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on an ad hoc basis when they arise is more likely (Hillman and Hitt, 1999: 828ff). Yet, the 
distinction between pluralist and corporatist settings may be important in Western countries, 
but cannot account for the much more strongly locally-embedded political capabilities that 
exist in non-Western settings (Carney et al., 2016; Oh & Oetzel, 2017; Darendeli & Hill, 
2016). Furthermore, the nature and degree of local embeddedness, will also affect the 
transferability of capabilities, which existing typologies neglect. We propose a new typology 
of political capabilities that takes into account their transferability and is summarized in table 
1.  
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Table 1: Transferability and Formality/Codification of political capabilities 
Type Underlying Political 
Resources 
Political Capabilities Codifiability Transferability/Stickiness 
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
na
l p
ol
iti
ca
l c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s 
Commissioning policy 
papers 
Ability to scan policy 
environment and 
acquire professional 
policy intelligence;  
 
Ability to provide 
credible and valuable 
information to policy 
makers 
Largely codifiable or even 
commodified and available 
in market place 
High transferability 
Gathering policy 
intelligence 
 
Policy monitoring 
 
Evidence to 
parliamentary 
committee 
Replies to official 
consultation 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l p
ol
iti
ca
l 
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s 
MNE competence and 
experience   
Identifying and 
mobilizing the political 
resources needed for 
effective CPA in a 
given context;  
 
Mobilizing internal 
resources to influence 
host country policy 
environment 
 
Constituency building 
 
Medium-level of 
codifiability: Formal 
organizational policies, 
procedures, codifiable, but 
important part of tacit 
knowledge. Transferable 
through personnel 
Medium transferability 
MNE standards and 
procedures 
Use of MNE PA 
resources 
 
PA expertise 
Financial resources 
PR resources 
Re
la
tio
na
l 
po
lit
ic
al
 
ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s  
Co
lle
ct
iv
e 
re
la
tio
na
l 
Membership in 
associations or interest 
groups 
Effectively using 
business associations to 
influence policy; 
 
Coalition- building 
through associational 
activity; 
 
Providing policy-
makers with valuable 
information and 
incentives 
Difficult to codify Limited transferability 
Direct formal and 
informal contacts to 
political decision-
makers (association 
level) 
Coalitions 
Pe
rs
on
al
 re
la
tio
na
l  
Direct formal or 
informal contacts with 
political decision-
makers (individual 
level) 
Leveraging personal 
relationships to 
block/promote certain 
regulatory or policy 
changes; 
 
Not codifiable Low transferability 
CEO’s professional 
networks 
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 Provision of valuable 
information or 
incentives 
 
Like existing typologies (Lawton et al., 2013a; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), we 
distinguish internal- or ‘organizational’ from external political capabilities. Organizational 
political capabilities are those that are readily available within the organization (e.g. internal 
expertise) (Jensen and Szulanski 2004). They draw on organizational resources such as 
internal policy analysis, public affairs departments etc. While organizational capabilities may 
be codified (e.g. through internal regulations and formal policies – Teece et al., 1997), they 
may also be based on tacit, non-codifiable knowledge. Organizational capabilities are by 
definition, contingent on the organizational institutional environment in the sense that 
organizations will develop them in reaction to the institutional environment in which they 
originate (Child et al., 2012). Therefore, we would expect organizational capabilities of 
DMNEs and their subsidiaries to differ from DFs from relationship-based systems. 
We further distinguish two types of external capabilities, namely capabilities deployed 
based on market transactions, which we call transactional capabilities, and capabilities 
deployed via social networks, which we call relational capabilities. Capabilities in the 
transactional category broadly correspond with capabilities required for what Hillman and 
Hitt (1999) call the transactional CPA approach and include capabilities linked to 
‘information strategy’, such as formal lobbying (Hillman and Hitt 1999). They are 
characterized by their reliance on formal market exchanges based on codified knowledge-
assets. Thus, official exchange of expertise and information e.g. through formal channels such 
as responses to consultation procedures, fall into this category. Similarly, formal lobbying 
efforts such as a company’s ability to acquire political intelligence from a third party – e.g. a 
policy research or consultancy firm - would also qualify as a transactional political capability. 
Generally, transactional political capabilities – like other market-based (intangible) assets 
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(Barnard, 2010) – can be acquired in the market place, and tend to be codifiable and 
commodifiable, which decreases their stickiness. As such, they are related to tangible 
resources – including financial ones – used by firms in the financial political strategy as 
described by Hillman and Wan (2005). 
In contrast, relational capabilities, which correspond with capabilities used in Hillman 
and Hitt’s (1999) relational approach to CPA, include formal and informal contacts and ties 
with political decision-makers that are based on non-codified and often implicit knowledge. 
Following Zhang et al. (2016), who distinguish collective CPA from personal ones, we 
further distinguish relational political capabilities according to whether they exist at the 
individual level or at the collective level of the organization. Thus, memberships in industry 
associations or interest groups are collective relational political resources, while a CEO’s 
personal network is classified as an personal political resource (cf. Zhang et al. 2016). In 
practice, the difference may not always be clear-cut. Thus, formal and informal meetings with 
public officials can be classified either as a collective capability (e.g. managers as 
representatives of the company meeting with public officials) or a personal one (a top 
manager meeting with public officials based on friendship-, family-, or other personal ties). 
However, the two can be analytically distinguished, based on the motivation for action; 
namely personal loyalty/friendship or organizational objectives. 
Transferable capabilities exist in all three categories e.g. money is an easily-
transferable organizational capability, membership in a business association an easily 
transferable collective relational one (cf. Bonardi, 2011). However, we would still expect the 
first two categories in this typology to be more readily transferable than capabilities of the 
relational type, because relational ones are usually mainly based on tacit knowledge in the 
form of personal relational skills and hence not codifiable (Hillman & Wan, 2005). We would 
also expect collective relational capabilities to have some degree of transferability, while 
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personal relational ones have the lowest transferability, because they are tied to specific 
individuals rather than being impersonal like organizational relationships. Therefore, they can 
only be transferred through upper-echelon personal conduits (cf. Edwards et al., 2015). 
The question of transferability of different types of capabilities has implications for 
the question of their value, to which we now turn. 
2.5. Value and institutional fit of political capabilities 
The value of a political capability can be defined in two ways: firstly, its availability 
to the firm and secondly its usefulness in dealing with the institutional environment – i.e. its 
“institutional fit.” 
Regarding availability, the political capabilities literature generally follows the 
“resource-based view” in considering that the resources a political strategy generates are 
“valuable, inimitable, and imperfectly mobile across firms” (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008: 
512). Tacit knowledge reduces the imitability and hence transferability of routines across 
firms and thus increase their value (Kotabe et al., 2011). Yet, transferability of political 
resources and capabilities within firms may be key to MNC competitiveness in fast changing 
environments by making important capabilities available. Here codifiability and hence 
imitability, which increases intra-MNE transferability, may increase rather than decrease the 
value of a political capability to a given firm. Indeed, Bonardi (2011) argues that the key 
RBV tenant of inimitability of resources has only limited relevance for the value of political 
capabilities. Thus, the most important political resource – money spent on lobbying and 
campaign contributions - is not hard to imitate (Bonardi, 2011: 248). The same is true, to an 
extent, for membership in business associations; another widely-used – and hence evidently 
valuable – political resource (Bonardi, 2011). In terms of the “fit paradigm” transferable 
political capabilities are valuable, because they allow it to achieve “organizational fit.” 
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Yet, while transferability may positively affect political capabilities in terms of 
availability, it may have a contrary effect on the second determinant of political capability 
value, namely “institutional fit.” Thus, Oh and Oetzel (2017) find that knowledge-assets 
transferred through the MNE tend to be more superficial and less adapted to the local context 
than locally-developed ones. Here our typology suggests a different way in which the value of 
political capabilities is determined, namely through their “institutional fit” with the 
environment. The more rule-governed a system is, the more transactional political capabilities 
will be effective and hence valuable, because market-based political resources are available 
and market-based CPA is legitimate (Lawton et al., 2013a). Conversely, the more 
relationship-based it is, the more personal and organizational political ties can be expected to 
be important for effective CPA (Boddewyn, 2016; Sun et al., 2010). Within relationship-
based systems, the more discontinuous political risks there are, the more context-specific 
political capabilities will have to be to be effective (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). Since personal 
relational political capabilities are the most context-specific, they are hence most legitimate 
and valuable in achieving “institutional fit” in such situations. 
Organizational political capabilities are less easy to classify in terms of “institutional 
fit,” because they have by definition co-evolved with the institutional environment. Indeed, a 
company’s experience will lead it to develop specific capabilities, which are adapted to the 
local environment (Oh and Oetzel, 2017). Therefore, their fit with the dichotomy of 
relationship- vs. rules-based institutional environments is contingent on the company’s 
history and previous experience. For MNEs from rule-governed systems, however, the 
organizational political capabilities can be expected to be potentially valuable in both types of 
environments, because they have been developed in reaction to a transaction-based 
environment and are hence in general more versatile than relational ones (Hillman & Wan, 
2005). 
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We expect the interaction between transferability and institutional fit to determine the 
effectiveness of MNE subsidiary CPA. The more relationship-based a system (especially 
when risk is discontinuous), the more transferable transactional capabilities lose value and the 
stickier relational ones become important, the nature of organizational capabilities in 
developing locally relational ones may hence determine the effectiveness of the subsidiary’s 
political strategy (cf Table 2).  
Table 2: Institutional fit and value of political capabilities in a host-country setting 
Political 
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risk) 
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In our empirical study, we apply this framework to develop propositions regarding the 
competitive advantage implications of the transferability of political capabilities. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Empirical context: Institutional backsliding in a post-socialist country 
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To explore how Western subsidiaries adapt their CPA to an increasingly volatile 
political environment, we focus on the case of Hungary in a period of radical institutional 
change. We focus on MNEs from developed countries and assume that they all share a 
fundamentally rule-governed home environment, while Hungary as host environment has 
increasingly moved from a relatively rule-governed to a relationship-based one, and risk has 
increasingly become discontinuous.  
Since the start of its post-socialist transition in the 1990s, Hungary has been an 
important case for scholars (Martin, 2013; Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Whitley et al., 1996). By 
the mid-2000s, it had advanced to one of the most consolidated democracies among post-
socialist countries (EBRD, 2005). Since the 2010 elections, - when Viktor Orbán’s 
conservative party Fidesz acquired a two-thirds majority in the parliament – however, 
Hungary’s “democracy score” has declined, bringing it closer to some of the less developed 
semi-consolidated democracies, like Romania and Bulgaria (Walker and Habdank–
Kołaczkowska, 2012: 6). This recent trend that has been observed in several post-socialist 
countries has been termed ‘backsliding,’ which describes the move from the initial pro-
market reform path towards a more authoritarian political system and a more state-controlled 
economy (Greskovits, 2015; Sedelmeier, 2014).  
3.2 Case selection and research design 
Our study is based on a longitudinal case study, which is suitable to investigate the 
temporal and processual nature of the phenomenon under investigation, namely the 
development of political strategies using transferred political capabilities (cf. Carney et al., 
2016).  
Hungary as a case of continuing post-socialist transition (Meyer and Peng, 2016) that 
experienced an important ‘external shock’ in the form of the authoritarian Fidesz government 
of Viktor Orbán acquiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2010, which allowed him to 
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fundamentally change the political system, culminating in the March 2013 constitutional 
amendment. This shock led to a phase of ‘backsliding’ (Greskovits, 2015), which is 
synomnymous with institutional uhpeaval and discontinuous political risk. Hungary therefore 
constitutes a natural experiment that can shed light on the transfer of political capabilities to 
deal with volatile political contexts. Natural experiments can “offer insights into the causal 
relations between variables and so can provide a firm foundation for theory development” by 
illuminating and extending theory (Darendeli and Hill, 2016: 6). We use a multiple-group 
before-after design in the sense that we compare the strategies to deal with the Orbán 
government’s increasingly authoritarian and unpredictable nature across a group of Western 
MNEs and domestic Hungarian firms. 
3.2.1 Sample 
Our first group is constituted of Western MNEs. Our sample is based on purposive 
sampling through predetermined selection criteria, as it is often the case in qualitative 
research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Ideally, the sample should be constituted in a way that 
holds as many variables as possible constant (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). Yet, due to the small 
size of the Hungarian economy and the sensitive nature of the topic at hand, which led to a 
low willingness of firms to participate in the study, our MNE sample comes from different 
home countries and different industries. Nevertheless, they form a single group in terms of 
the spatial and institutional proximity of the home countries, which are all highly developed 
western countries. This choice is justified by our interest in the ability of MNEs from rule-
governed countries to transfer political capabilities to relationship-based systems. The second 
group are domestic Hungarian firms also distributed across a variety of sectors. The 
Hungarian firms constitute a control group in the sense that it is composed of domestic firms, 
which do not have the possibility of transferring capabilities. 
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While a self-selection bias cannot be completely excluded, we are confident that our 
results are not affected by this shortcoming. Indeed, the sectoral composition of the sample is 
diverse: Overall, our sample contains firms from eleven different industries. The largest 
industries in our sample were ICT and the construction sector. 
3.2.2 Treatment 
The treatment is the amendment in March 2013 of the constitution that the Fidesz 
government had enacted only in 2012. While the Fidesz government had a super-majority in 
parliament since the 2010 election, the process of ‘backsliding’ started after the power of the 
Supreme Court had been curtailed and the government thus obtained nearly unlimited 
legislative power with the constitutional change in 2013. Indeed, in 2014, PM Orbán declared 
Hungary to have become an “illiberal state” (Magyar, 2016: 62). Our data collection started 
in 2011 and ends in 2017. The period of 2011-3 constitute our ‘before’ period, because the 
institutional system during this period was still relatively stable compared to the institutional 
upheaval following the 2013 constitutional amendments, although the Orbán government was 
already in control. Moreover, our first interviews often related to companies’ experience with 
the pre-2010 institutional environment. 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
Our data stem from multiple rounds of data collection and a variety of sources: in-
depth interviews with business leaders and experts from the context of the case, as well as 
documentary analysis of news and various reports over seven years. Data collection and data 
analysis was carried out in parallel. We went back and forth in an iterative process to interpret 
our material and reflect on how it advanced our understanding of the constructs used in the 
literature. Overlaps in data collection and analysis are beneficial, since it speeds up the 
analysis and “reveals helpful adjustments to data collection” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 535).  
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To obtain multiple perspectives and a more complete and nuanced view of firms’ 
political capabilities, we sought a range of opinions as recommended for this type of research 
(Perry, 1998: 798). We carried out 56 semi-structured interviews (see table 3):  43 with business 
leaders working at MNE subsidiaries and domestic firms and a further 13 with experts in the 
context of the case. The MNE subsidiaries in the sample originated from the US (6), France 
(4), Germany (3), United Kingdom (1), Switzerland (1), Denmark (1), Italy (1), and the 
Netherlands (1). We tended to interview only one person per company, because political 
activity in Hungary is virtually always limited to the very top of the managerial hierarchy 
(Sallai, 2013). Therefore, in most cases the CEO, the Managing Director or the public affairs 
director were deemed to possess the necessary information to answer our questions. Due to the 
longitudinal nature of the study, we have interviewed in several cases the same respondents 
both in the early years of the Orbán regime in 2011-2013 as well as recently in 2015-17. We 
carried out 32 interviews in the first period (2011-2013) and another 24 in the second (2015-
2017). This allowed us to obtain informed views on the changes over time. 
Table 3: Number of interviews per sector, title of interviewee and date 
Company industry (number of interviews) Position of interviewee  
 
 
 
Date of interview 
Banking (6) 
CEO (Subsidiary) 15.07.2016 
CEO (Local) 13.07.2016 
CEO (Subsidiary) 24.01.2012 
Vice-CEO (Local) 07.03.2012 
CEO (Subsidiary) 26.01.2012 
Vice-CEO (Subsidiary) 07.03.2012 
Construction (7) 
Director (Local) 15.07.2016 
CEO (Subsidiary) 10.04.2015 
CEO (Subsidiary) 11.01.2012 
CEO (Local) 07.03.2012 
CEO (Local) 15.11.2011 
Director (Local) 20.06.2011 
CEO (Local) 22.06.2011 
Energy (6) 
PA Director (Subsidiary) 10.04.2015 
PA Director (Subsidiary) 06.05.2013 
Director (Local) 04.08.2011 
Head of Strategy (Local) 02.07.2011 
PA Director (Subsidiary) 06.09.2011 
Director (Local) 31.08.2011 
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ICT (7) 
CEO (Local)  12.04.2017 
Director (Subsidiary) 16.02.2017 
CEO (Local) 16.07.2016 
Director of Government Affairs 
(Subsidiary) 26.01.2012 
Former CEO (Subsidiary) 05.09.2011 
CEO (Local) 16.06.2011 
Former Director of Government 
Affairs (Subsidiary) 01.09.2011 
Manufacturing (5) 
Director (Subsidiary) 31.05.2017 
CEO (Subsidiary) 23.08.2016 
CEO (Subsidiary) 23.08.2016 
CEO (Local) 15.12.2011 
CEO (Local) 20.06.2011 
Telecommunication (2) 
CEO (Subsidiary) 15.08.2016 
Vice-CEO (Subsidiary) 09.08.2015 
Retail (4) 
Director (Subsidiary) 15.07.2016 
Director (Subsidiary) 13.08.2016 
Director (Subsidiary) 16.04.2012 
General Managing Director 
(Local) 08.05.2011 
Wholesale (2) 
CEO (Local) 13.02.2017 
CEO (Local) 30.03.2012 
All other sectors: tobacco, tourism, advertising, 
beverages (4) 
Director (Subsidiary) 16.02.2017 
Managing Director (Subsidiary) 16.08.2016 
Managing Director (Local) 16.02.2013 
CEO (Local) 30.03.2012 
Experts from the context of the case (13)  
Secretary General 17.02.2017 
Managing Director 13.04.2017 
Secretary General 29.05.2017 
Secretary General 16.08.2016 
Public affair Director 13.08.2016 
Managing Director 23.01.2012 
Secretary General 11.01.2012 
Managing Director 22.11. 2011 
Executive Director 16.11.2011 
Director  09.11.2011 
Managing Director 28.09.2011 
Journalist 31.05.2017 
Political adviser 31.08.2011 
Total number of interviews (56) 
2011 (18), 2012 (12), 2013 (2), 
2015 (3), 2016 (12), 2017 (9) 56 
Total number of interviews at firms (43) 
MNE subsidiaries 23 
Domestic firms 20 
 
In-depth interviews are an insightful method for exploring the “often nuanced causal 
factors of specific managerial action” (Lawton et al., 2013b: 231). By allowing comparison 
(Flynn et al., 1990), the semi-structured interview technique provided a single framework for 
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the different interviews but also gave flexibility to ask questions in relation to previously not 
identified issues that arose from the interviewee’s responses (Bryman, 2004). 
Interviews were conducted in English and in Hungarian. Interviews in Hungarian were 
translated by one of the authors. Interviews were conducted and recorded by one of the 
researchers at the respondents’ offices and were later transcribed. Each interview lasted for 50-
90 minutes. Most interviews were carried out in Budapest.  
In addition to the interviews, we used secondary sources to increase our confidence 
about the reliability of the interview responses. We analyzed over 70 pieces of printed and 
online newspaper articles and reports from corporate websites, journalistic sources, and 
publications by reputable NGOs such as Transparency International. Due to the lack of 
scholarly research on these topics in Hungary, such sources are often the only information 
available and are more reliable than official government sources.  
After the transcription of the interviews we used the NVivo software to perform an 
open coding of the data according to recurring themes. This first step was followed by and 
compared to a process of axial coding. We used both open and axial coding, because we seek 
to “refine and differentiate concepts that are already available” (Böhm, 2004: 271). Indeed, 
we used the theoretical concepts of stickiness, transferability, value, transactional-, 
organizational-, and (personal and collective) relational political capabilities as our categories. 
In the post-coding stage, we followed Miles and Huberman’s (1994) framework - namely the 
process of reducing data, displaying data, and drawing and verifying conclusions. 
The goal of the analytical process was to determine whether the different political 
capabilities fall into the categories of “sticky” or transferable. We looked for evidence 
indicating the stickiness and transferability of different capabilities and how they are acquired 
or developed by different firms. Next, we selected the most relevant quotes that would 
illustrate the different capabilities of each firm type. We then used our other data to better 
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understand how these capabilities were developed and used and whether these capabilities 
were transferable or not (explanation building).  
In the last step of data analysis, we used our data to understand how the value of 
different political capabilities has changed as a result of the changes in the institutional 
environment and how the availability of capabilities changed as a consequence.  
During the second round of interviews, we started to refine emerging themes and 
asked respondents to comment directly on specific aspects of our emerging findings. The use 
of this type of external check mitigated the potential biases of individual respondents and 
enabled us to induce richer insights from the aggregate data (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). 
Throughout the overlapping data collection and analysis, we sought to critically 
engage with the interview data and situate them within the broader context of informants’ 
interests and social position. Through this process of triangulation and iteration, we sought to 
decrease possible bias and interpret the data in a more nuanced manner (Yin, 2003). 
4. Findings  
Our empirical case allows us to explore how foreign subsidiaries seek to develop effective CPA 
strategies to cope with radically changing institutional environments, while achieving both 
“organizational-” “institutional fit.” We present our findings distinguishing three phases, the 
transition period from 1989 to 2010 when formal structures of interest representation became 
more important in Hungary and the institutional system more generally shifted towards a 
Western-style rule-governed environment – especially in preparation for EU-membership – 
(EBRD, 2005). This process was halted when Orbán’s Fidesz party obtained a two-thirds 
majority in the 2010 election, which marks a change in direction of institutional reform that we 
call “backsliding.” While relatively slow and tentative at first, backsliding accelerated after the 
adoption of the new constitution in 2014, which is why we consider the years since 2014 as a 
new phase, characterized by high levels of unpredictability and discontinuous political risk.  
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Before Orbán’s accession to power and in the early phase of his government, our interviews 
show that while subsidiaries relied on all three types of capabilities (transferable transactional 
and organizational ones, as well as stickier relational ones), DFs predominantly relied on 
relational capabilities. Indeed, MNEs were able to leverage transferred transactional and 
organizational capabilities to engage with the formal policy-making process, even during the 
early Orbán years when the government started to make these formal channels more difficult. 
Virtually all respondents stressed the difference in the availability of transactional and 
organizational capabilities for MNEs and their absence in DFs, which meant DFs were largely 
excluded from the formal policy-making process. One respondent stated: 
“When the government – reluctantly – sends documents for review or debate, it 
tries to prevent opinions by sending the document last night, requiring feedback 
by the following morning. Companies are normally not prepared to submit any 
feedback to these. But multinationals are prepared to give feedback even in 24 
hours.” (Respondent, Subsidiary11) 
Top managers of subsidiaries want to know who is dealing with a given policy in the different 
ministries, because transferable organizational capabilities allow them to prepare analysis-
based lobbying documents that can be channeled into the legislative process early on 
(Respondent, Subsidiary11). Some DFs too undertake certain types of transactional political 
strategies – e.g. systematic legislative monitoring (e.g. Respondent, Local 16). However, 
these strategies appear less effective than MNE subsidiaries’ activities due to the relative lack 
of organizational resources compared to subsidiaries (e.g. Respondent, Local 9; Respondent, 
Local 8). One respondent stated: 
“Hungarian lobbying is more a surface type lobbying, not carrying hundreds of 
pages of professional arguments” (Respondent, Local 5). 
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It becomes hence clear that during the pre-Orbán and early-Orbán phase, MNE subsidiaries 
achieved a comparative advantage by transferring transactional and organizational political 
capabilities from the home country. These capabilities both achieved “organizational fit” and 
“institutional fit” with an increasingly rule-based environment. Yet, even then, the 
institutional context in Hungary was still more relationship-based than the Western MNEs’ 
home context. This implied that to achieve “institutional fit” relational political capabilities 
were important for MNEs too. Our interviews show that when entering the country, 
subsidiaries were at a certain disadvantage compared to domestic firms, because they lacked 
local relational resources to deal with the relational host context and these relational 
capabilities could not be easily transferred from the home environment (e.g. Respondent, 
Subsidiary 14). Local firms, on the other hand, were often well-connected to the state 
bureaucracy. As the respondent from one local firm simply put it: “[We] have to have good 
contacts with the state. We know everybody” (Respondent, Local 10; similarly, respondent 
Local6). 
However, MNEs managed to overcome this disadvantage by locally developing 
relational political capabilities. Interestingly, however, they did so by leveraging their 
transactional and organizational political capabilities. One important way in which MNE 
subsidiaries developed collective relational capabilities is by hiring well-connected local staff 
– effectively using the MNE’s organizational capability to pay good salaries to attract well-
connected individuals. Thus, interviewees at local subsidiaries stated: 
“The best is to employ somebody, or a company who have done this [political 
activity] already in this country.” (Respondent, Subsidiary10)  
 
“…we employed more Hungarian managers to develop business relationships but also 
political relationships”. (Respondent, Subsidiary4)  
 
More generally, the CEO plays a much more important role in managing political 
activities and is often involved in direct political negotiations with policy-makers. Previous 
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studies have shown the importance of top-level political networks for successful CPA in 
Hungary (Sallai, 2013). The CEO represents a subsidiary-related resource that is integrated 
into the local political strategy through personal relational capabilities.  
In short, during the first two phases foreign subsidiaries were able to develop 
successful political strategies by leveraging transactional and organizational political 
capabilities in an increasingly rule-governed environment, while local firms had not 
developed transactional and organizational capabilities to deal with such an environment. 
This suggests that the transfer of transactional and organizational political capabilities and 
leveraging them to locally develop relational ones allowed subsidiaries to achieve 
“organizational-” as well as “institutional fit” and provide them with an advantage compared 
to DFs. Table 4 summarizes the key findings regarding the availability of different types of 
political capabilities to MNEs and DFs and provides representative quotes from the 
interviews.  
Table 4: Availability of political capabilities to subsidiaries and domestic firms 
 Representative Quotes 
Type of capability Examples MNEs Domestic Firms 
Transactional 
capabilities 
Political strategy 
Policy papers 
Coalition building 
Intelligence 
Policy monitoring 
Policy replies 
“Hungarian companies do it [lobbying] 
on their own, or they go through an 
association and plus they engage in 
their own ways as well, by finessing… 
At [multinationals,] it [lobbying] is 
coordinated. And in the associations 
our professionals prepare very serious 
documents and all the lobbyists of the 
industry say the same. We argue for 
industrial interests.” (Respondent, 
Subsidiary11) 
 “Our interest representation was 
not very effective before either, 
but today even less. There is 
[only] the media and our 
[informal] discussions with the 
decision-makers.” (Respondent, 
Local 09) 
Organizational 
capabilities 
MNE competence 
and experience  
MNE standards and 
procedures 
Use of  of MNE PA 
resources 
PA expertise 
“There is huge experience and 
background internally at these 
companies [MNE subsidiaries]. They 
have a professional for this 
[lobbying/CPA] and international 
support. They collect international 
benchmarks; they hire consultants to 
write policy papers, and even 
legislative proposals.” (Respondent, 
Subsidiary11) 
“Hungarian companies do not 
have political departments, not 
even a person, who does it.” 
(Respondent, Local 9) 
 
Also: Respondent, Local 01; 
Respondent, Local 12 
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Relational 
capabilities 
   
 
Collective 
relational 
Membership in 
associations or 
interest groups 
 
Direct formal and 
informal networks to 
political decision-
makers (association 
level) 
Collective 
 
 “If we look at the last two years, what 
we could do – it is almost zero. There 
was no openness for negotiations, no 
cooperation. There is no way of 
entering [networks around the 
government].” (Respondent, 
Subsidiary14) 
Also: Respondent Subsidiary 2 
Collective  
 
“We can do lobbying through the 
engineering association that 
represents individuals, but we are 
also members of consultant 
engineers, the Hungarian chamber 
of commerce. We believe it is 
very important to be represented 
on events. Everything depends on 
personal contacts, you never 
know. “(Respondent, Local 1) 
Also: Respondent, Local 16; 
Respondent, Respondent, Local 5, 
10; Respondent, Local 6) 
Personal 
relational  
Direct formal or 
informal contacts 
with political 
decision-makers 
(individual level) 
CEO’s professional 
networks 
Personal 
 
“I know a lot of decision-makers. I 
organize meetings between leading 
decision-makers like ministers and 
state secretaries and the management of 
my company. “(Respondent, 
Subsidiary11) 
Personal 
 
 
“Therefore, we have to have good 
contacts with the state. We know 
everybody. This is a small 
country. “(Respondent, Local 10) 
Also Respondent, Local0 6 
 
As the Orbán government consolidated its power – notably with the constitutional 
amendments of 2013 and after the re-election in 2014, the regime adopted increasingly 
authoritarian features moving the country towards a more particularistic relationship-based 
system characterized by discontinuous political risk; a process that can be termed 
“institutional backsliding”. 
As institutional pressures to engage in relationship-based exchanges became stronger, 
the “institutional fit” between political capabilities transferred from the subsidiaries’ parent 
and the host environment decreased, reducing thus the value of these capabilities. Thus, 
CEOs of subsidiaries are losing some of their influence, notably due to the increasing 
nationalism of the government: 
“First they [MNEs] need to find a good CEO, it is rare that a foreigner is allowed 
in this.” (Respondent, Subsidiary10)  
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Faced with discontinuous political risk, even the strategy of hiring local CEOs to establish 
political ties with the government has become less efficient due to the constantly and 
arbitrarily changing formal and informal rules:  
“[T]he problem [with hiring well-connected locals] is that they knew the old 
mechanisms. The new mechanisms under this government are different.” 
(Respondent, Subsidiary10) 
Simultaneously, subsidiaries’ ability to engage in the new types of CPA required to cope with 
the increasingly relationship-based and authoritarian regime is limited by headquarter 
standards, creating a tension between “institutional-” and “organizational fit.” Our interviews 
clearly show that during institutional backsliding, money has once again become an important 
political resource (Respondent, Local 7). While money is one of the most liquid and hence 
transferrable political resource (Bonardi, 2011), in the specific context of backsliding, MNE 
subsidiaries lack the capability of mobilizing it (at least overtly), due to home-country/parent 
pressures. Our interviews suggest that, subsidiaries’ leeway in engaging in bribery to get 
access to the political arena appears more limited than domestic firms’, because MNEs tend 
to have stronger anti-corruption standards and are potentially exposed to stronger scrutiny of 
home-country media and anti-corruption activists than domestic firms. In other words, the 
increasing misfit between the home institutional environment and the host environment, 
decrease the value of this political capability due to the lack of legitimacy of certain practices 
in the home country context. Thus, one respondent referred to the dilemma that “direct 
communication” with officials was important, but that he was reluctant to use such channels, 
because of what the company would have to offer in exchange (namely monetary payments): 
“The official forum for lobbying is the [industry] association and they lobby with 
the public decision-makers. Of course, there are some personal negotiations 
beyond this forum. It is a dilemma for me as it may be useful to have more direct 
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communication, but the question is what do we say, what do we offer.” 
(Respondent, Subsidiary4) 
In this context, indirect forms of monetary transfers have emerged, which are less obviously 
contradicting Western subsidiaries’ home country institutional pressures and can provide an 
alternative channel to bribes. The most usual ones are supporting specific charities selected 
by people close to the governing elite and contracting a consultancy firm specialized in public 
affairs, which then gains access to the political arena, without the subsidiary knowing how. 
One CEO described the way in which the consultancies treat the companies’ requests for 
access as ‘smoke and mirrors’ (Respondent of Subsidiary5).  
Moreover, despite of the increasing personalization and informalization of state-
business relationships during institutional backsliding, the government has also established 
new – more closely state-controlled – formal ways for companies to engage with the 
authorities. The most important one is the so-called “strategic partnership” between firms and 
the government. As one respondent explained: 
“The big change came with the signature of the strategic partnership with the 
government. […] What these agreements can really help [with], is to build 
highest-level relationships. If I say that I have an issue they will arrange a 
meeting on the highest level. 2-3 times a year our European leader can meet the 
Minister and we get reassuring messages. We use this a lot more recently.” 
(Respondent, Subsidiary 7) 
Strategic partnerships thus provide a way for MNE subsidiaries to acquire (collective) 
relational political resources without having to resort to practices that are incompatible with 
home-country institutional pressures and parent company standards (e.g. Subsidiary15). 
In summary, our interviews show that up to the election of Orbán as PM in 2010, the 
increasingly rule-based institutional environment allowed subsidiaries to leverage 
35 
 
organizational and transactional political capabilities, which were available to them due to 
their being part of an MNE. Since at least 2013, however, the institutional environment in 
Hungary has once again become much less favorable to rule-based transactions, which has 
decreased the value of transactional capabilities, but also of collective relational ones, until 
they have become virtually worthless in a context of discontinuous political risk. The only 
remaining political resources that allow firms to have their voice heard in the political arena 
are particularistic, personal relationships with politicians and public officials close to the 
Orbán clan or outright bribery. Particularistic relationships are not transferable and MNEs 
may hence lose some of their competitive advantage compared to local companies. Bribery, 
on the other hand, constitutes an example where a very easily transferable capability (money) 
has lost its value for MNEs due to the increasing conflict between the need for 
“organizational fit” with home-country shaped capabilities and “institutional fit” with the 
host-country environment. Indeed, as the “financial incentive strategy” (Hillman & Wan, 
2005) moves away from campaign financing to less legitimate and even illegal forms, this 
capability has lost its value for MNE subsidiaries, because these practices clash with home 
country institutional pressures (e.g. anti-bribery norms and legislation). Our interviews show 
indeed that although, most subsidiaries seem to be aware of the “availability” of the necessary 
capabilities in the new environment, not all of them are able to acquire them. This suggests 
that the need for “organizational fit” constitutes an important roadblock to transferability and 
effective CPA. Yet, we also find that MNEs have found ways to develop alternative 
capabilities e.g. consultancy firms or “strategic agreements” with the government, which are 
considered legitimate in both home and host country. Our findings are summarized in Table 
5. 
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Table 5: Political capabilities and institutional context 
Transition phase Institutional pressures Type of 
political risk 
Political 
capabilities 
Value of 
capability 
Availability of 
capabilities to... 
 Rule-
governed, 
impersonal 
exchange 
Relationship
-based, 
personal 
exchange 
   MNE DF 
Shift to rules-
based system 
(1989-2010) 
Strong Moderate 
(decreasing) 
Continuous Transactional High High Low 
Organizational High High Low 
Collective 
relational 
High Medium High 
Personal relational Moderate Low High 
Early Orbán 
years (2010-14) 
Moderate 
(decreasing) 
Moderate 
(increasing) 
Continuous Transactional Moderate High Low 
Organizational High  High Low 
Collective 
relational 
Moderate Low High 
Personal relational High Low High 
Backsliding 
(2014-17) 
Weak Strong Discontinuous Transactional Low Low High 
Organizational Moderate High Low 
Collective 
relational 
Low Low High 
Personal relational High Low High 
 
Our findings allow us to further extend the theory of political capabilities. Thus, they 
show that subsidiaries not only combine different types of capabilities – some transferred, 
others locally developed – but actively use transferable ones to develop relational ones. Thus, 
MNE subsidiaries “buy in” political relations by appointing well-connected individuals from 
the host country. Different types of capabilities can hence be combined to develop an 
effective CPA strategy. Yet, which capabilities are valuable and available to different firms 
depends on their inherent transferability, and on “organizational-” and “institutional fit.” 
Our interviews indicate that the meta-capability of leveraging transferable political 
capabilities to create relational ones allows subsidiaries to gain a competitive advantage over 
local firms whose relational capabilities are initially superior, but who lag behind MNE 
subsidiaries regarding organizational and transactional capabilities. We propose: 
Proposition 1: MNEs will leverage transferable transactional and organizational 
political capabilities in the host country to locally develop “sticky” relational ones. In 
a situation of transition towards a more rule-governed system – where transactional 
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capabilities are valuable – this provides MNEs with a competitive advantage 
compared to DFs.  
However, the leveraging of these different types of capabilities will depend on the 
institutional pressures emanating from the host country’s political context. During 
backsliding, pressures increase towards relationship-based personal exchanges and political 
risk becomes increasingly unpredictable and incalculable. As a result, the value of (personal) 
relational capabilities increases, that of transactional ones decreases. Thus, one respondent 
argued  
“There are some [name of sector] leaders, who keep more permanent relationships 
with these institutions, and we can see that legislation is more beneficial for those who have 
better networks.” (Respondent, Subsidiary4) 
Subsidiaries adapt to these changes by incorporating more of the collective and 
personal relational capabilities into their localized political strategy compared to their 
transactional and organizational ones. We propose:   
Proposition 2: MNEs adapt their CPA to the host country’s institutional pressures by 
mobilizing different types of capabilities. As the institutional pressures move towards 
relationship-based exchanges, MNEs will incorporate more “sticky” relational 
capabilities into their host-country CPA, whereas when the institutional pressures 
move towards rule-governed exchanges, subsidiaries will rely more on transferable 
transactional and organizational capabilities.  
Our findings also show that transferred capabilities can provide subsidiaries with a 
competitive advantage not by neatly fitting the host country institutional context, but by 
providing MNEs with complementary capabilities that local firms do not possess to the same 
extent. We therefore propose: 
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Proposition 3: transference of political capabilities shaped by an institutionally very 
different home-country environment increase MNE subsidiaries’ ability to adapt their CPA to 
the host country context by providing the company with a wider range of capabilities to draw 
from. While such transferred capabilities may not neatly fit the host context, they may 
complement locally developed capabilities in ways that lead to effective CPA and competitive 
advantage. 
Yet, even the meta-capability of mobilizing transactional and organizational political 
capabilities to develop relational ones reach their limit when faced with an increasingly 
volatile institutional environment, where successful political activity requires personal access 
to a small elite, which often needs to be obtained by means that are incompatible with home 
country pressures. Indeed, the political capabilities required for effective engagement with the 
increasingly autocratic state are not (openly) supported by the headquarters. Therefore, the 
tensions created by institutional volatility continue to increase for subsidiaries to the point 
where home-country legitimacy requirements are not compatible with host-country 
requirements anymore. Here, the need to achieve “organizational fit” does become a 
roadblock to achieve “institutional fit” of CPA with the volatile host environment. We 
therefore propose: 
Proposition 4: As “backsliding” of the host country’s political context reaches a 
certain point, MNEs’ ability to adapt will decrease due to their home-country’s and 
parent company’s legitimacy requirements.  
The performance implication is that domestic firms may be better able to adapt to the 
backsliding environment, while MNEs are more constrained in the development of effective 
political strategies in that context, reducing their competitive advantage. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
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By considering how simultaneous home- and host country institutional pressures 
create a dual challenge for subsidiaries to achieve both “organizational-” and “institutional 
fit,” our study makes an important contribution to the understudied question of how 
institutional differences across countries shape MNE political activities (Doh et al., 2012: 27; 
Liedong et al., 2015). We argue that further developing the “fit paradigm” (White et al., 2018) 
as applied to CPA, requires us to incorporate two dimensions into existing typologies of 
political capabilities, namely the varying transferability/stickiness of political capabilities and 
the contingency of their value in volatile political environments (“institutional fit”).  
We focus on the case, where the home environment is stable and rule-governed, while 
the host country environment is relationship-based and characterised by a shift to increasingly 
discontinuous political risk. We find that subsidiaries do not merely adapt to relationship-
based contexts by engaging in relational strategies (Luo and Zhao, 2013), but design a 
localized “combined” political strategy that combines transferred political capabilities with 
locally developed ones. This finding is in line with previous literature on transference of 
practices (Gamble 2010). This is because not all political capabilities are easily transferrable 
from home to host country and because some that are transferrable may not be valuable in 
certain host environments, leading to a need for subsidiaries to develop them locally. 
Interestingly, we also find that subsidiaries leverage parent organizational- and transactional 
capabilities to locally develop relational ones. As such, our study complements previous 
research that found that emerging market MNEs can transfer capabilities they developed to 
cope with a politicized economy in their home system to relatively similar host contexts 
(Carney et al., 2016). This has been termed the “adversity advantage” of MNEs from home-
countries with weak institutional environments (cf. Ramamurti, 2009). Our findings suggest, 
however, that in certain circumstances, MNE political capabilities developed in institutionally 
different, more rule-governed, home countries can provide firms with complementary 
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transactional and organizational political capabilities, which in combination with newly 
acquired, relational capabilities allow them to develop effective CPA. Advanced country 
MNEs therefore possess a “prosperity advantage” when developing CPA for a relational 
context. 
Yet, our framework also suggests that the value of transactional and certain types of 
organizational capabilities will decline when the institutional environment moves away from 
a rule-governed one towards a relationship-based one and when political risk becomes less 
predictable or discontinuous (Oh and Oetzel, 2017) as is the case in a phase of “backsliding.” 
Based on the transferability-value dilemma, whereby transferable and hence easily available 
capabilities for subsidiaries are increasingly less valuable in relational environments 
characterized by discontinuous risk, we would expect subsidiaries have to increasingly rely 
on locally-developed personal relational capabilities to achieve “institutional fit.” However, 
this has implications for “organizational fit” of the subsidiary strategy with capabilities that 
are shaped by a “rule-governed” home environment. Here, the dual challenge of 
“organizational-” and “institutional fit” becomes increasingly an obstacle to successful 
adaptation to the volatile environment. Therefore, our study also has implications for the 
theory of volatile institutional environments (Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Oh and Oetzel, 2017). 
It shows that up to a point, MNE subsidiaries are exceptionally well-equipped to deal with 
such environments due to their capability to mobilize different types of capabilities to 
formulate effective CPA. Yet, there may be a point where the environment may become too 
unpredictable for transactional and collective relational resources to have any value. This is 
where MNE subsidiaries may reach their limit of adaptability. 
5.1 Limitations and future research implications 
One limitation of our study is that it is based on an extreme case. This was a conscious 
choice, as such cases are particularly revealing of important empirical phenomena. However, 
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this raises the issue of the boundary conditions of our findings. We would expect that our 
insights are applicable to other post-socialist countries that have recently experienced phases 
of “backsliding” (e.g. Russia and Poland; cf. Orenstein 2013), but they may also be relevant 
for other cases where discontinuous political risk prevails. Future research should investigate 
in comparative fashion a wider range of such contexts.  
Another limitation is that we did not distinguish differences in our MNEs subsidiaries 
home setting. This is because we focused on the contrast between rule-governed and 
relationship-based nature of home and host country and surmised that all Western countries 
are close to a fairly stable rules-based system in Peng’s (2003) sense. Yet, some of them use 
relationships more extensively than others. This may provide MNE subsidiaries from such 
countries with certain resources and capabilities that make them particularly successful in 
adapting to relationship-based systems in emerging markets (see Porter 1990 for the case of 
Italian companies in developing countries). 
Our study also relates to the question of “institutional duality” (Kostova and Roth, 
2002). Previous research into institutional duality showed that MNEs can tap into capabilities 
from multiple local contexts and integrate them to create a range of competitive advantages 
(Kostova et al., 2008; Meyer et al., 2011; Regnér and Edman, 2014; Saka-Helmhout et al., 
2016). Our findings suggest that whether institutional duality is a resource or a constraint for 
an MNE may depend on whether the capabilities required in a specific host context are 
transferable or not. Future research should more systematically conceptualize and investigate 
the link between institutional duality and transferability of capabilities.  
5.2 Managerial implications 
From a practitioner’s point of view our study illustrates the importance of subsidiary-
level political strategy design and the role of subsidiaries’ top management in this process. 
Our findings hint at the important tensions that emerge for foreign subsidiaries due to 
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“backsliding.” It indicates that developing relational capabilities of both the collective and – 
increasingly – personal type seems key to a successful political strategy in such contexts. 
However, it becomes also clear that faced with a government that increasingly disregards 
formal channels of interest representation, foreign companies may face delicate ethical 
questions in crafting effective CPA. Therefore, effective CPA should not be done by host 
country senior management or the subsidiary in insolation (as it is generally the case), but 
needs to be coordinated with the parent company. Two issues are particularly important for 
effective host-country CPA: Firstly, the headquarters need to provide clear and effective 
guidelines about the limits of personal relational capabilities; Secondly, confidential and 
supportive communication channels between the subsidiaries top management and the 
headquarters are required to provide guidance on complex ethical decisions when dealing 
with host governments. 
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Appendix 1 
Figure 1: A model of subsidiary CPA in emerging markets 
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